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COMMENT
Security and Innocence Under CERCLA:
The Battle Against Confusion
Bruce Taterka
This article analyzes the confusion which has sur-
rounded CERCLA's secured creditor exemption and in-
nocent landowner defense. This confusion is primarily
centered on the phrases "participation in management"
as used in the security interest exemption, and "all ap-
propriate inquiry" as used in the innocent landowner
defense. These phrases are undefined by CERCLA, and
the case law has provided conflicting interpretations. As
a result of this uncertainty, no clear guidelines exist by
which environmentally diligent real estate lenders and
purchasers can insulate themselves from potential CER-
CLA liability.
The author, however, notes that recent regulatory
and private sector activity marks a trend toward clarify-
ing the defenses. The article reviews proposed legislation
and regulations defining the terms of the defenses, and
discusses the policy implications of the proposed
schemes. It is also noted that industry standards for con-
ducting property transfer environmental audits are de-
veloping, providing meaning for the phrase "all appro-
priate inquiry." The article concludes that as the
215
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statutory defenses are maturing confusion is subsiding,
and that new regulations and the emergence of industry
standards should provide guidelines within which truly
"innocent" lenders and purchasers can operate in the
future without the unreasonable fear of CERCLA.
I. Introduction
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 was enacted by Congress
in 1980 to provide a regulatory scheme for the cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites. One of the effects of CERCLA is that it
can place liability for the entire cost of hazardous waste
cleanup on the current owner of a site, regardless of whether
he was responsible for or had any knowledge of the presence
of contamination at the site.2 CERCLA can also place liability
for cleanup on a lender whose borrower's operation has con-
taminated a site.' Strict CERCLA liability can thus impose
enormous hazardous waste liability on relatively "innocent"
parties. Purchasers risk buying into CERCLA liability when
they acquire a site, and lenders face two sources of potential
liability: 1) by becoming entangled in the management of a
borrower's contaminated facility,' and 2) by foreclosing on
and taking possession of contaminated properties.5
Recognizing the severity of CERCLA liability, Congress
provided two exceptions to apply in certain situations. In the
first exception, lenders may be protected from CERCLA lia-
bility if they merely hold a security interest in a property and
do not participate in its management.6 In the second, a de-
fense to CERCLA liability is allowed for landowners who un-
knowingly purchase contaminated sites, provided they exer-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA]. CERCLA was
reauthorized by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
2. See infra note 16.
3. See infra note 31.
4. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
6. CERCLA § 101(20)(A). See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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cise due diligence in an effort to discover hazardous
substances prior to purchase.7 The source of the confusion ad-
dressed in this comment lies in the fact that there are no clear
standards, either statutory or regulatory, to guide the actions
of good-faith lenders and purchasers so that they may confi-
dently of avoid CERCLA liability. Additionally, the courts
have exacerbated the confusion surrounding CERCLA by pro-
viding inconsistent interpretations of the statutory defenses.
The result of this confusion is that almost all real estate
transactions today have some degree of CERCLA risk
attached.8
The confusion surrounding CERCLA's defenses has gen-
erated a fair amount of litigation and enormous criticism. For
the past several years, lawyers, business people, and Congress
have waged a battle against CERCLA confusion by attempt-
ing to define the parameters of the statutory defenses through
the development of regulations,9 legislation, 0 and industry
standards.1"
This paper focuses on the battle against the confusion
surrounding the two primary statutory defenses to CERCLA
liability - the section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense,
and the section 101(20)(A) secured creditor exemption. Each
defense is discussed separately. The discussion includes an
overview of the statutory scheme, the varying judicial inter-
pretations of each defense, the proposed legislative amend-
ments, and the policy considerations associated with the vary-
ing interpretations of each defense. It is concluded that
although the confusion surrounding CERCLA - the uncer-
tainty of the terms of its statutory defenses - is currently as
high as it has ever been, relief may be at hand.
7. CERCLA §§ 107(b)(3), 101(35). See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
8. Potential CERCLA liability is associated with traditional real estate transac-
tions as well as business transactions in which corporate control of potentially con-
taminated sites is involved. J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HAND-
BOOK 96-97 (10th ed. 1989).
9. See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 131.
1991]
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II. Discussion of the CERCLA Liability Scheme
A. CERCLA Clean Up Actions
Whenever there is a release 12 or threat of a release of a
hazardous substance's into the environment, the federal gov-
ernment is authorized to arrange for cleanup actions. If a "po-
tentially responsible party" (PRP) 4 is identified and the gov-
ernment determines that the PRP is capable of conducting
the cleanup, the PRP may be allowed to carry out and pay for
the action.15 Where PRPs are unidentified, incapable or un-
12. CERCLA § 101(22) states:
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emit-
ting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or dispos-
ing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of bar-
rels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which
results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a
claim which such persons may assert against the employer of such persons,
(B) emission from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, air-
craft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of [nuclear mate-
rial from a nuclear incident subject to financial requirements of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission], and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
13. CERCLA § 101(14) states:
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated
pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33 [Clean Water Act], (B) any ele-
ment, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to sec-
tion 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics
identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pol-
lutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Adminis-
trator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does
not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not in-
clude natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
14. CERCLA § 107(a) refers to a PRP as a "covered person."
15. CERCLA § 104(a)(1) states:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substan-
tial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or con-
taminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the pub-
lic health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss1/6
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willing to carry out and finance the cleanup actions, the gov-
ernment may conduct the cleanup action using money from
the Superfund. 16  Once the government has expended
Superfund money to clean up a site, any PRPs for that site
are liable to reimburse the Superfund for the entire cost in-
curred by the government. 7
B. CERCLA Responsible Parties
Once a PRP is identified, he may be held strictly liable
national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and pro-
vide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated natu-
ral resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment. When the President determines that
such action will be done properly and promptly by the owner or operator of
the facility or vessel or by any other responsible party, the President may
allow such person to carry out the action, conduct the remedial investigation,
or conduct the feasibility study in accordance with section 9622 of this title.
16. CERCLA § 104(a). The Superfund is a 1.6-billion dollar fund allocated by
Congress under CERCLA, and replenished with 8.5-billion dollars under SARA, to
finance government response costs at hazardous waste sites. CERCLA § 111(a).
17. CERCLA § 107(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of,
(3) any person who [arranged for disposal, treatment, or transportation
of hazardous substances],
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities ... from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government ... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
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for all costs incurred as a result of the release.' 8 PRPs mainly
include hazardous waste generators,19 transporters, and past
and current "owners and operators" of a facility 20 where there
is a release or threat of release2' of hazardous substances.22
Parties who have been held liable as an "owner and operator"
include owners or operators,23 lessors, lessees,2" lenders who
finance contaminated sites,2 5 and unknowing purchasers of
contaminated sites.2 6
Lenders who finance contaminated property may be
found liable under CERCLA in two different ways.27 If the
lender takes title to contaminated property through foreclo-
sure, he may be liable as the current owner of the site.2 8 A
lender may also be held liable for participating in the manage-
ment of a borrower's contaminated facility.2
18. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner of
a site from which there is a release or threat of release may be held strictly liable
under CERCLA without regard to causation); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.
Co., [18 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,133 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987)
(held employer strictly liable for intentional illegal acts of an employee under
CERCLA).
19. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (held that
waste generator defendants must present specific evidence demonstrating that all of
their waste was removed from the site prior to the release of hazardous materials,
thereby establishing that their waste was not associated with the release).
20. CERCLA § 101(9) defines a "facility" broadly. The courts, too, interpret
CERCLA broadly. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849
F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (held that a subdivision built on the site of a defunct wood-
treating operation is a "facility" within the meaning of CERCLA § 101(9)).
21. See supra note 12.
22. See supra note 13.
23. See Tanglewood East Homeowners, 849 F.2d 1568 (rejected defendant's ar-
gument that liability may be imposed upon only those persons who both own and
operate a polluted property).
24. See infra note 106.
25. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
27. See Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Lender Liability Under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 41 S.C. L.
Ri. 705 (1990).
28. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Md. 1986) (defendant lender was held liable under-section 107(a) as a current owner
when it foreclosed on and subsequently purchased and maintained ownership of con-
taminated property).
29. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text..
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In sum, the CERCLA liability scheme allows the federal
government to place the burden for cleanup costs on PRPs
who are essentially "innocent" with respect to the hazardous
substances at a site. The resulting remediation costs may run
into millions of dollars. The remediation activities may in-
clude conducting extensive hydrogeological investigations to
characterize the contamination, excavation of the site, dispo-
sal or treatment of contaminated soil and groundwater, pro-
viding alternate water supplies to those affected by the con-
tamination, conducting health effects studies, and other costs
associated with the hazardous substances."0
III. The Defenses to CERCLA Liability
A. The Security Interest Exception for Lenders
1. The Statutory Scheme: CERCLA Section 101(20)(A)
Section 101(20)(A)(iii) of CERCLA provides an exception
to the definition of "owner and operator." This exception ap-
plies to a lender who, "without participating in the manage-
ment of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest.""1 The key to this "security in-
30. CERCLA §§ 104, 107.
31. CERCLA § 101(20) states:
(A) The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any
person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case
of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating
such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was
conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or
similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately be-
forehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in
the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
(D) The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or
local government which acquired ownership or control [of a facility] involun-
tarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circum-
stances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its
function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not
apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility,
and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this
1991]
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terest" exception is the interpretation of the phrase "partici-
pating in the management of a ... facility. 32
The section 101(20)(A)(iii) security interest exception in-
dicates a congressional intent to provide protection for finan-
cial institutions that hold title primarily to secure a loan, as
long as the financial institution does not participate in the
management of the facility.33 Unfortunately, neither the stat-
ute nor the sparse legislative history of CERCLA provides
meaningful guidance on the degree of management participa-
tion required to incur liability.34 No clear standards exist for
establishing whether a lender has participated in the manage-
ment of a facility.3 5 The lack of standards has created an
acute problem in the banking community, as enormous CER-
CLA liability may arise from small and apparently benign
properties."6 The problems associated from the lack of stan-
dards has been exacerbated by conflicting interpretations by
the federal courts of appeal.3 7
2. The Security Interest Exception As Applied by the
Courts
The initial standard for management participation was
established in United States v. Mirabile.38 The Mirabile court
held that a secured creditor who does not participate in the
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under sec-
tion 9607 [CERCLA § 107] of this title.
32. See Roslyn Tom, Interpreting the Meaning.of Lender Management Partici-
pation Under Section 101 (20) (A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 926 (1989).
33. CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(iii).
34. The House Report on CERCLA provides no guidance for interpreting the
meaning of the section 101(20)(A) phrase "participating in the management of a facil-
ity." See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6181.
35. See Michele B. Corash & Lawrence Behrendt, Lender Liability Under CER-
CLA: Search for a Safe Harbor, 43 Sw. L.J. 863, 865 (1990); Tom, supra note 32.
36. Corash & Behrendt, supra note 35, at 865. "[M]any lenders are now reluctant
to make loans to borrowers that face even a small possibility of environmental liabil-
ity." Id.
37. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
38. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985); [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
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operational, production, or waste disposal activities of a bor-
rower's facility is free from liability if the creditor merely
forecloses on the property after the cessation of hazardous
waste activities.3 9 Mirabile distinguished "nuts-and-bolts in-
volvement" with hazardous substances from mere financial in-
volvement, holding that the security interest exception shields
creditors from liability unless they have participated in the
"operational, production, or waste disposal activities" of the
facility.40 The Mirabile standard was applied, more or less, in
lender liability cases until 1990."
The Mirabile security interest exception was narrowed in
United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co."2 In Mary-
land Bank, the defendant lender foreclosed on and held title
to a contaminated waste site. The EPA subsequently under-
took remediation activities at the site. The government then
undertook an enforcement action against the defendant
lender.," The Maryland Bank court held that the security in-
terest exception was not available to a foreclosing lender who
holds title to a facility at the time of a cleanup." A lender in
such a situation has an ownership interest rather than a secur-
ity interest, and is thus not protected by the secured creditor
exception.' 5 The Maryland Bank court distinguished Mirabile
on the basis that the Mirabile lender promptly (within four
months) assigned the facility to a third party upon foreclo-
sure.' 6 The court warned that a broadened application of the
security interest exception to mortgagees-turned-owners
"would convert CERCLA into an insurance scheme for finan-
cial institutions." "[M]aking prudent loans" was the recom-
mended course for lender protection.7
39. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. .(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20.993. In Mirabile the se-
cured creditor successfully bid on the property at the foreclosure sale, but subse-
quently assigned their bid to the Mirabiles. Id.
40. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996-97.
41. See infra text accompanying note 49.
42. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
43. Id. at 575-76.
44. Id. at 579.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 579, n.5; see also id. at 580.
47. Id. at 580.
1991]
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The Mirabile standard for management participation was
applied by a federal district court in the first of the United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp.4 8 decisions. The district court in
Fleet Factors held that the security interest exception permits
a creditor to provide financial assistance, and even isolated in-
stances of specific management advice, to its debtors without
risking CERCLA liability if the creditor does not participate
in the day-to-day management of the facility."9
Both the Mirabile and Maryland Bank standards were
applied in Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing
Corp. .5 The court in Guidice held that a bank's inspection of
a borrower's contaminated facility and participation in its fi-
nancial matters did not violate the terms of the security inter-
est exception prior to the bank's foreclosure on and purchase
of the property. 1 Upon foreclosure, however, the bank be-
came liable as a current owner.2
After several years of relative consistency in which the
courts permitted lenders to take limited action without violat-
ing the secured creditor exemption, the scope of the exemp-
tion was drastically narrowed by the Eleventh Circuit in the
appeal of the Fleet Factors decision. In the Fleet Factors ap-
peal,53 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Mirabile nuts-and-
bolts standard as too permissive. Instead, it held that a se-
cured creditor may become liable "by participating in the fi-
nancial management of a facility to a degree indicating a ca-
pacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes. ' 54 This "capacity to influence" test created a much
broader standard for lender management participation than
the Mirabile standard and raised potential lender liability to a
new level. Fleet Factors essentially changed the interpretation
of management participation from one of actual participation
48. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), rev'd, 901 F.2d 1550 (llth Cir. 1990).
49. Id. at 960.
50. [20 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,439 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1,
1989).
51. Id. at 20,441.
52. Id. at 20,441-42.
53. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
54. Id. at 1557.
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to one of an ability to participate. To qualify for the security
interest exception under Fleet Factors, lenders must limit
their role to one in which they are incapable of influencing
their borrowers' hazardous substance management practices.
While lenders who do so may be protected from CERCLA lia-
bility, they also assume the additional risk of the toxic de-
struction of their security interest. Such a dilemma was dis-
counted by the Fleet Factors court, which explained that
rather than encouraging lenders to disassociate themselves
from their borrowers' operations, the "capacity to influence"
test "should encourage potential creditors to investigate thor-
oughly the waste treatment systems and policies of potential
debtors."55 The Fleet Factors decision thus endorses an active
role for lenders in policing the environmental integrity of
their borrowers' facilities.
The Eleventh Circuit's "capacity to influence" test was
avoided by the Ninth Circuit in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.. 6
Bergsoe involved a sale of bonds to finance a lead recycling
facility operated by Bergsoe. Due to financial difficulties,
Bergsoe was forced into bankruptcy by the bank who held the
bonds, and by the issuer of the bonds, the Port of St. Helens,
to whom Bergsoe was indebted. When the bank filed suit
against Bergsoe's owners to collect on its debt, Bergsoe's own-
ers counterclaimed, alleging that the bank and the Port were
liable under CERCLA for the cost of cleaning up lead contam-
ination caused by Bergsoe's operation at the facility. To deter-
mine whether the security interest exception applied to the
bank and the Port, the court first carefully considered the
purpose for which the Port held the deed to the Bergsoe prop-
erty. It found that the Port's purpose was limited to protect-
ing a security interest. The second step in the court's analysis
was to determine whether the bank and the Port participated
in the management of the facility. The court considered the
rule articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors, but
avoided endorsing the Fleet Factors "capacity to influence"
standard.
55. Id. at 1558.
56. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
1991]
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In Bergsoe, the court claimed to avoid ruling on a man-
agement participation standard, preferring to "leave for an-
other day" the opportunity to establish such a rule.5 7 The
court reasoned that under any interpretation of CERCLA's
management participation doctrine "there must be some ac-
tual management of the facility before a secured creditor will
fall outside the exception. Here there was none, and we there-
fore need not engage in line drawing. "58 Although the Ninth
Circuit claimed to avoid articulating a rule which would con-
flict with the Eleventh Circuit's Fleet Factors decision, the
Ninth Circuit's standard of actual participation can be inter-
preted to be at odds with the Eleventh Circuit's "capacity to
influence" standard.
The United States Supreme Court, at the urging of the
federal government, has declined to settle the differences
among the Circuit Courts of Appeals." The Supreme Court
decided not to consider an appeal of the Eleventh Circuit's
Fleet Factors decision, 0 in which it could have articulated a
management participation standard.
3. The EPA's Proposed Interpretive Rule Defining
. Lender Liability Issues
In an effort to clarify the permissible level of lender man-
agement participation under the secured creditor exemption,
the EPA has issued a proposed rule to limit liability of finan-
cial institutions under CERCLA. 1 Recognizing that the Elev-
57. Id. at 672.
58. Id.
59. Lender Liability Under Superfund Law Will Not Be Reviewed By Supreme
Court, [21 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1675 (Jan. 18, 1991).
60. Id. Review was denied because of the interlocutory nature of the appeal. The
case will return to the federal district court to determine the degree of the defend-
ant's management participation at the facility. Id.
61. EPA Proposal to Limit Liability of Financial Institutions Under CERCLA
(Signed June 5, 1991), [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 430 (June 14,
1991). The proposed rule would be codified as a revision to the National Contingency
Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 - 300.86 (1991). This proposal was issued twice in draft form.
See Proposed Draft Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA (Jan. 24, 1991), [21
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991); EPA Draft Proposal
Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CER-
[Vol. 9
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enth Circuit's Fleet Factors "capacity to influence" standard
heightened lender uncertainties, the EPA's proposed rule
specifies the type of actions which may be taken by lenders
while remaining within the bounds of the exemption.
Under the proposed rule, the section 101(20)(A) phrases
"indicia of ownership" and "primarily to protect a security in-
terest" would serve to limit the exemption to true security in-
terests.2 The proposed rule would allow a foreclosing creditor
to take possession of a secured property without triggering
CERCLA liability, provided that the creditor acts solely to
protect a security interest.63 New or continuing releases of
hazardous substances would not trigger section 107 strict lia-
bility unless a plaintiff could prove that the defendant is an
"owner or operator." '64
The proposed rule defines the section 101(20)(A) phrase
"participation in the management of a facility," which has
been the main source of uncertainty following the Bergsoe
CLA (Sept. 14, 1990), [21 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162 (Oct. 12,
1990) [hereinafter EPA Draft Proposal].
62. The proposed rule states that the security interest exception is limited to a
"legally recognized security interest, and not an interest in property held for some
other reason," such as for investment purposes. [22 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) at 435. The distinction between "interests in the nature of an invest-
ment" and "security interests" may, in some circumstances, be a difficult one, espe-
cially where property held by a lender serves dual purposes of securing a debt and
producing revenue. See id. The "facts of each case" determine whether a transaction
creates a security interest within the section 101(20)(A) exemption. Id. at 442 n.4.
63. Id. at 438. In order-to demonstrate that a foreclosed-on property is held to
protect a security interest, the creditor must at least advertise the property for sale
within twelve months of foreclosure, and not reject a written offer of fair considera-
tion at any time after six months after foreclosure.
This issue has raised concern among federal agencies, particularly the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and the Small Business Association. Property Held For More Than Six Months
Not Investment, Agencies Say on Lender Liability, [21 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1733 (Feb. 1, 1991). These agencies and others may be under a statutory
duty to maximize financial recovery on defaulted loans, which could require holding
foreclosed properties for more than six months. Id. However, the proposed rule reiter-
ates CERCLA's exception from the definition of "owner and operator" for govern-
ment entities who involuntarily acquire contaminated property. [22 Current Develop-
ments] Env't Rep. (BNA) at 442 n.14. See also supra note 31.
64. [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) at 434.
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Metals and Fleet Factors" decisions. The proposed rule
states:
Participation in the management of a facility means, for
the purpose of Section 101(20)(A), actual participation in
the management or operational affairs by the holder of
the security interest, and does not include the mere ca-
pacity, or ability to influence, or the unexercised right to
control facility operations.6 7
A security holder would be considered to be participating in
management if it exercised decision making or management-
level control over its borrowers' environmental compliance to
such a degree that it undertakes responsibility for hazardous
substance management practices.6 8 A lender would not be
considered to be participating in management by inspecting
the secured property or even requiring the borrower to clean
up hazardous substances during the term of the security inter-
est.8 Loan work out activities would not be considered to be
participating in management, if structured to "protect and
preserve the security interest in an effort to prevent default of
the obligation or the diminution in value of the security. '70
Owner and operator liability will attach, however, when a se-
cured creditor's actions cause a release or threatened release
of hazardous substances, thereby creating an independent ba-
sis for liability under CERCLA section 107(a)."
By requiring a standard of actual management participa-
tion, rather than the mere ability to participate, the proposed
rule endorses the Ninth Circuit Bergsoe Metal position and
rejects the Eleventh Circuit "capacity to influence" standard
as articulated in Fleet Factors.
The promulgation of the EPA rule would be a significant
65. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
66. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
67. [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) at 441.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 437.
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step in reducing secured creditor confusion. Not only would
the proposed rule serve as a basis for limiting the circum-
stances in which the government would be inclined to bring a
CERCLA action against a secured creditor," it would also
provide definitions and guidelines for courts to apply in third-
party CERCLA cost recovery actions against lenders.73
4. Proposed Legislation to Amend and Expand the Se-
curity Interest Exception
In addition to the regulations being developed by the
EPA, the battle against secured creditor confusion is also be-
ing fought in Congress. In 1989, two House bills were intro-
duced by Congressman LaFalce. 4 These bills sought to in-
clude commercial lending institutions, who acquire
"ownership or control" of a contaminated property in order to
protect a security interest, within the section 101(20)(D) ex-
ception for governmental entities who involuntarily acquire
contaminated properties through sovereign action.75 A bill
with a similar effect was introduced by Senator Garn in
1990.7'6 Had any version of these bills been enacted, the pro-
tection afforded to governmental entities by section
72. See Lender Liability Issues Attract Attention at Annual American Bar As-
sociation Meeting, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1148, 1149 (Aug.
23, 1991).
73. Id. at 1148-49.
74. H.R. 2085, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. E 1325 (1989); H.R. 4494,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. E 1023 (1989).
75. See supra note 31.
76. Senator Garn proposed S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), an amendment
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988), to provide that:
No insured depository institution or mortgage lender shall be liable under
any law imposing strict liability for the release, threatened release, storage or
disposal of a hazardous substance or similar material from property -
(1) acquired through foreclosure;
(2) held in a fiduciary capacity; or
(3) held, controlled or managed pursuant to the terms of an extension of
credit.
This exemption would not apply to any person who (1) caused the release, (2)
failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent the release, or (3) benefitted from a
government response action.
S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1102 (1990).
1991]
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101(20)(D) would have been broadened to protect private in-
terests. Liability would not attach to lenders participating in
management to such a degree amounting to "control" if such
control was exercised for the purpose of protecting a security
interest. Neither would owner liability attach upon
foreclosure. 7
Such restructuring of the CERCLA liability scheme
would significantly shift the burden for hazardous waste site
clean up costs from the private to the public sector. Section
101(20)(D), as it stands, protects government entities from
CERCLA liability where they involuntarily acquire title
through sovereign action,78 thus allowing the cleanup of pub-
licly owned contaminated sites to be financed by the
Superfund 9 If government entities were not protected by sec-
tion 101(20)(D) and had to expend their own funds for haz-
ardous waste clean up, the Superfund would be strengthened
while the unfortunate government entities suffered. This
would merely amount to a redistribution of government funds.
However, the proposed broadening of section 101(20)(D) to
include mortgage lenders would benefit private entities at the
expense of the Superfund. Such a policy conflicts with Con-
gress' intention to hold private parties strictly liable for the
costs of cleanup, particularly those who directly or indirectly
benefit from the release of hazardous substances.80 The pro-
posed legislation would amount to a bailout for lenders who
finance contaminated sites.
A more sound policy would be to develop definitive stan-
dards for CERCLA lender liability over institutions which
commit loan funds and exercise management control of se-
cured properties.8 1 More recently proposed legislation em-
77. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1102 (1990).
78. See supra note 31.
79. See supra note 15.
80. See Roger J. Marzulla, Keynote Address, [18 News & Analysis] Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,350 (Sept. 1988). "Congress has made the choice in CERCLA
•.. that the responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste across this nation ought to
rest upon those who in one way or another profited from, or otherwise helped to
create, those sites." Id. at 10,351.
81. Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 27, at 732.
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braces this approach, focusing on providing definitions and
standards rather than blanket protection for lenders. In 1991,
Congressman Owens proposed the "Superfund Liability Clari-
fication Act," which defines management participation con-
sistently with the EPA's proposed rule. 2 A bill introduced in
1991 by Congressman LaFalce provides similar clarification of
the secured creditor exemption.83 Both of these bills clarify
the scope of the exemption while leaving CERCLA's basic pol-
icy intact. Creditors are permitted to take environmentally re-
sponsible action to protect their security interest without in-
curring CERCLA liability. Under the Owens bill, a lender
causing or contributing to a release of hazardous substances is
strictly liable under CERCLA section 107(a),84 while under
the LaFalce bill the liability of such a lender is limited to the
costs attributable to his actions.8 5
82. H.R. 1643, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Under H.R. 1643:
participation in the management of a vessel or facility does not include -
(I) selling collateral;
(II) actions taken by a mortgage lender [to conduct environmental investiga-
tions into a borrower's facility consistent with guidelines imposed pursuant
to H.R. 1643];
(III) actions taken by a mortgage lender.., upon learning of any contamina-
tion so as not to cause a release... or [to] wind down the affairs of the owner
... or while diligently proceeding to pass title of the vessel or facility;
(IV) the status of having the capacity or ability to affect hazardous waste
disposal management decisions of the vessel or facility; or
(V) engaging in so-called 'work-out' activities ....
Id. § 2.
83. H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This bill defines the term "partici-
pating in the management" as "actual, direct, and continual or recurrent exercise of
managerial control by a person over the vessel or facility in which he or she holds a
security interest, which managerial control materially divests the borrower ... of such
control." Id. § 1.
84. "Nothing in this subparagraph shall affect the liability .. of a person who,
by any act or omission, causes or contributes to a release . H.R. 1643, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
85. H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess, § 1 (1991). "A person who . . . causes or
exacerbates a release or threatened release . . . shall be liable for the cost of such
response, to the extent that the release or threatened release is attributable to the
person's activities." Id. § 1. Congressman LaFalce maintains that this provision would
create a "carrot and stick" situation for creditors. By imposing liability based on
fault, secured creditors would be encouraged to take environmentally responsible ac-
tion without becoming exposed to the full force of strict CERCLA liability. See 137
CONG. REC. H1769, H1770 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1991)(statement of Rep. LaFalce).
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Senator Garn introduced the most pro-banking bill of the
102d Congress, the "Federal Deposit Insurance Improvements
Act of 1991." '8" The Garn bill would limit hazardous waste lia-
bility on "insured depository institutions" and "mortgage
lenders" to the "actual benefit conferred" on the lender by
the cleanup, provided the lender has not actively directed or
conducted the operation resulting in the release. 7 In addition,
the bill rejects Fleet Factors by prohibiting hazardous sub-
stance liability "based solely on .. .the unexercised capacity
to influence" operations.88
5. Policy Considerations
In order to clarify the current standard of lender liability,
Congress must reconcile two conflicting views on how to pro-
mote environmentally responsible action by lending institu-
tions. One view promotes an active role for the commercial
lending industry in investigating and policing, the environ-
mental liability of its borrowers. Under this view lending in-
stitutions would not subject themselves to CERCLA liability
by influencing the owners of properties to take environmen-
tally corrective action.89 Congress implicitly endorsed this
view in CERCLA section 101(20)(d), added by SARA in 1986,
by expressly providing a broad exception from liability for
governmental entities but left unchanged the security interest
exception for lenders."0 Under the other view, subjecting lend-
ing institutions to broad CERCLA liability would encourage
increased foresight and supervision. 1
86. S. 651, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
87. Id. § 152(a). The bill also provides protection from costly CERLCA cleanup
actions by stating that "actual benefit conferred ... shall not exceed the fair market
value of the property following such action." Id. § 152(b).
88. Id. § 152(a)(3).
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 31; Alan P. Vollmann, Double Jeopardy: Lender Liability
Under Superfund, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 11 (1987).
91. Critics of lender liability reform argue that the redefinition of management
participation as proposed by the EPA rule and the LaFalce and Garn bills would
"remove an effective enforcement tool and reduce environmental vigilance of lend-
ers." EPA Official Disputes Need Under CERCLA for Amendment Offering Protec-
tion to Lenders, [21 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 2252 (Apr. 19, 1991).
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Holding lenders liable for their borrower's toxic releases
requires the commercial lending industry to employ environ-
mental safeguards prior to and after financing a transaction.2
Prudent lenders will both thoroughly investigate a site prior
to the financing of a transaction9" and closely monitor their
debtors' hazardous waste management practices during the
life of the security interest. 4
The policy of holding lenders strictly liable for minimal
management participation is countered by three arguments.
First, such requirements make it difficult for borrowers to se-
cure loans.9 5 Lenders must effectively "self-insure" their oper-
ations, resulting in heightened caution in committing loan
funds and higher interest rates.9 Congress has recognized that
State attorneys general have also asserted that such provisions would weaken state
efforts to clean up hazardous substance sites. See id. at 2253; see also Amy T. Phil-
lips, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Deal For Bankers?, [22 Current De-
velopments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1158 (Aug. 23, 1991).
92. See Paul A. Dominick & Leon C. Harmon, Lender Limbo: The Perils of En-
vironmental Lender Liability, 41 S.C. L. REv. 855 (1990). "In order to minimize expo-
sure to environmental liability, lenders should develop an environmental risk and lia-
bility policy." Id. at 870.
93. The Fleet Factors court stated that setting the management participation
standard at the "capacity to influence" level "should encourage potential creditors to
investigate thoroughly the waste treatment systems and policies of potential debt-
ors." 901 F.2d at 1558. Thorough investigation is thus the pre-acquisition safeguard
required under Fleet Factors.
94. The Fleet Factors' court stated, "[slimilarly, creditors' awareness that they
are potentially liable under CERCLA will encourage them to monitor the hazardous
waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon compliance
with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and future finan-
cial support." Id. Creditors are especially well situated to investigate the hazardous
waste treatment policies of their debtors. Risk will be weighed into loan agreements,
thus creating financial incentives for good hazardous waste management practices by
borrowers. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558, n.12. Commentators have reasoned that
the driving force behind CERCLA is to clean up hazardous waste sites; therefore,
hazardous waste liability should be treated as a necessary cost of doing business and
less debate should be devoted to the protection of "innocent landowner[s]." See
Roger D. Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed on Landowner, Tenants,
and Lenders - How Far Can and Should They Extend?, [18 News & Analysis] Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,361, 10,362 (Sept. 1988).
95. "The spectre of lender liability under CERCLA threatens to stop lenders
from making loans with any component of environmental risk." Corash & Behrendt,
supra note 35, at 885.
96. See Laurie J. Hammers & T. Patton Youngblood, Comment, The Battle
Continues: Lenders are Still Searching for Well-Defined Methods to Avoid Hazard-
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strict CERCLA liability and the judiciary's narrow view of the
statutory defenses have created a "credit crunch" for farmers,
small businesses, contractors, and manufacturers. 7
Second, it may be impractical for the lending industry to
shoulder such a large burden in enforcing safe environmental
practices. If lenders decide to retain even minimal influence
over their borrower's operations, they may expose themselves
to strict liability as facility operators.0 8 Therefore, lenders who
chose to retain any degree of control will be forced to exert
complete control, effectively serving as environmental police-
men with respect to their borrowers' facilities.9 9 This may not
be an efficient or practical means of insuring environmental
compliance. The third reason is a corollary to the second rea-
son. If lenders decide that they do not want to risk incurring
liability as facility operators, they will be forced to relinquish
all capability of management participation. These lenders will
distance themselves from their borrower's hazardous waste
management programs and abandon, rather than assume con-
trol of, contaminated properties. 100
ous Waste Cleanup Liability, 19 STETSON L. REV. 633, 657 (1990).
97. 136 CONG. REC. S10,115 (daily ed. July 19, 1990) (statement of Sen.
D'Amato); see 136 CONG. REC. E1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep.
LaFalce) (there is "a disturbing trend in hazardous waste liability law which is
threatening the ability of thousands of small businesses to obtain the financing they
need to survive").
98. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
99. See Dominick & Harmon, supra note 92, at 870. Lenders must scrutinize
borrowers' past records and potential liability with respect to environmental
problems and carefully evaluate the environmental condition of the property serving
as loan security. Id.
100. See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 27, at 723 (lenders should "minimize
participation in the borrower's business or ownership of the property ... [U]pon
default, the lender should carefully weigh the risks [involved] in [a] foreclosure.");
Tom, supra note 32, at 928 ("[a] narrow interpretation of the phrase 'participating in
the management' . . . could encourage banks to monitor waste sites ... [and] engage
in workouts to recover loans . . . thus [enhancing the likelihood] that small waste
problems do not increase ...."); Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions
for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 180
("the very lenders who could conceivably encourage borrowers to engage in safer
waste handling and disposal practices also could be dissuaded from offering hazard-
ous waste disposal advice for fear of later being held liable for cleanup costs").
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B. The Innocent Landowner Defense
Unlike the section 101(20)(A) exemption, which is only
available to creditors, the section 107(B)(3) innocent land-
owner defense is available to any PRP facing liability as a fa-
cility owner, provided that the statutory requirements are
met. In enacting section 107(b)(3), Congress intended to pro-
tect parties who exercised due care in the purchase of prop-
erty, and were nonetheless ignorant that the property was
contaminated.' ' The defense also can be used by lenders who
have foreclosed on contaminated facilities and are otherwise
liable as facility owners under section 107(a).' 2
1. The Statutory Scheme: CERCLA Section 107(b)(3)
Once a PRP has been identified under section 107(a),
there are three defenses available under section 107(b). The
section 107(b) defenses are: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of
war; and (3) the "innocent landowner" defense. To qualify for
the "innocent landowner" defense, the owner of a contami-
nated site must prove that the contamination was caused by a
third party "in connection with a contractual relationship,"
and that the owner exercised "due care" with respect to haz-
ardous substances.' 03
101. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986).
102. The section 107(b)(3) defense may be asserted by a lender in addition to the
section 101(20)(A) secured creditor exemption. The EPA Draft Proposal states: "[in
the limited circumstances in which the secured lender is not in a position to claim the
security interest exemption for property which it owns, the lender/owner may seek to
defend itself as an innocent landowner in the same manner." See supra note 61, at
1166.
103. CERCLA § 107(b) states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a per-
son otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the dam-
ages resulting therefrom were caused solely by -
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the de-
fendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a pub-
lished tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the
1991]
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As CERCLA was originally enacted in 1980, the terms
''contractual relationship" and "due care" were not defined.
As a result, it was unclear whether "due care" required a pur-
chaser of a contaminated site to exercise due care prior to ac-
quisition in order to avoid acquiring a contaminated site,
whether it merely required that a purchaser exercise due care
with respect to hazardous waste after acquisition of the site,
or both.
The requirement that the third party action did not occur
"in connection with a contractual relationship" with the de-
fendant was even more confusing. It was unclear whether
deeds or other forms of conveyance established a "contractual
relationship" for section 107(b)(3) purposes. Furthermore, as-
suming that a deed establishes a "contractual relationship,"
defendants could argue that the action which caused the re-
lease did not occur in connection with the contractual rela-
tionship. To clarify the duties of a prospective purchaser,
Congress defined the term "contractual relationship" in
SARA. Section 101(35)(A), added in SARA, provides that a
"contractual relationship" is established by deeds and other
instruments transferring title, unless the owner was not re-
sponsible for the contamination of the site and, prior to
purchasing the site, exercised due diligence in investigating
the potential presence of hazardous substances.10
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exer-
cised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foresee-
able acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that
could foreseeably result from such acts or omission; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
104. CERCLA § 101(35) states:
(A) The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of [§107(b)(3)]
of this title, includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other
instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which
the facility concerned is located and was acquired by the defendant after the
disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility,
and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is
also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant
did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous sub-
[Vol. 9
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The effect of the definition of "contractual relationship"
is that the section 107(b)(3) defense now turns on whether a
purchaser has conducted an "appropriate inquiry" prior to ac-
quisition. If the findings of the inquiry give the purchaser no
knowledge or reason to know of any release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance, then the purchaser has no
constructive knowledge of the presence of contamination and
is deemed to have no "contractual relationship" with the pre-
vious ownership.
Unfortunately, the "appropriate inquiry" standard pro-
vides no indication as to what methods, if any, should be used
to detect hidden contamination prior to a transaction. No de-
finitive regulations or guidelines exist for determining whether
an "innocent" owner of a contaminated site has satisfied the
pre-purchase "appropriate inquiry" requirement.10 5 Thus, a
purchaser of real estate has no certain method of protecting
stance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was
disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the
facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or ac-
quisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by
purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or
bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that
he has satisfied the requirements of [§ 107(b)(3)(a) and (b)] of this title.
(B) to establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided
in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previ-
ous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the pre-
ceding sentence the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge
or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or
reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of
the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
105. The EPA has endorsed a subjective standard for evaluating "all appropriate
inquiry." Guidance on Landowner Liability Under Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA,
DeMinimus Settlements Under Section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements
with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989). A
"determination as to what constitutes 'all appropriate inquiry' under all the circum-
stances is to be made on a case by case basis .... In sum, the determination will be
made on the basis of what is reasonable under all of the circumstances." Id. at 34,238.
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himself from potential CERCLA liability."'
2. The Innocent Landowner Defense As Applied by the
Courts
This section discusses the existing section 107(b)(3) case
law, in which defendants have rarely succeeded. As is the case
with lender liability, judicial interpretation of the terms of the
defense has been inconsistent, making it difficult to identify a
clear rule. 107
In situations where a purchaser acquires a previously con-
taminated site, the defense is not available if the release of
hazardous substances continues after the new owner takes ti-
tle.108 The defense is most often denied on the basis of the
purchaser's knowledge, prior to purchase, of the potential
presence of hazardous waste at the site. If the purchaser or his
hired consultants possess or should possess a suspicion that
hazardous materials are present, the defense may be denied. 109
Even where a purchaser's consultants and engineers inspect a
facility prior to purchase and report that it is free of hazard-
106. Innocent landowners are "more than anxious to act in good faith and follow
the rules. They just do not know what the rules are any longer." 137 CONG. REC.
E1129, E1130 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Owens).
107. G. Van Velsor Wolf Jr., Emerging Contours of the CERCLA "Innocent Pur-
chaser" Defense, [20 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,483 (Nov.
1990).
108. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (held
that where a current owner of a site had knowledge of a past operator's hazardous
waste activities and failed to take precautions against the operator's foreseeable acts,
the section 107(b)(3) defense was precluded).
109. See Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257
(D.N.J. 1987) (where evidence indicated that defendant site owner had knowledge
that soil at his site was contaminated, and then sold the soil to plaintiff with the
knowledge that plaintiff intended to use the soil as fill, the section 107(b)(3) defense
was unavailable even though defendant was not responsible for the presence of the
contamination in the soil. PPG eventually agreed to pay $83.4 million under a New
Jersey Consent decree); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., [19 Litigation] Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,855 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1988) (even where a purchaser of a
contaminated site had been misled by the former owners or was genuinely unaware of
the potential for contamination, where the purchaser's hired consultants and counsel
possess information on the presence of hazardous substances at the site and the pur-
chaser somehow fails to obtain such information, the section 107(b)(3) defense is
unavailable).
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ous waste, the purchaser may not be protected. A 1988 case,
BCW Assoc. Ltd. v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,"' denied the
defense although the defendant owner and lessor hired an en-
vironmental consulting firm and an engineering firm to in-
spect a warehouse prior to purchase. In BCW Assoc., the court
held that the defense was unavailable because: 1) the defend-
ants had knowledge of the presence of dust in the warehouse,
although at the time they did not know it was actually haz-
ardous lead dust; 2) it was defendants' activities in the ware-
house after they took possession that caused the release of the
dust from the rafters; and 3) the defendants purchased the
warehouse "as is" and received substantial benefit from its
cleanup."
The defense is not available to an owner of a contami-
nated site where the contamination was caused by a lessee,
because a "contractual relationship" exists between the par-
ties. '12 Similarly, the owner of a site may not assert the de-
fense on the basis that the contamination was caused by an
illegal act of an employee, regardless of whether the act was
within the scope of employment.1 3 The defense is generally
not available to previous owners and operators of contami-
nated sites, or to hazardous waste generator defendants, re-
gardless of who is responsible for the release of the waste or
how long after waste generation the release occurs." 4 Courts
110. 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 943 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1988), available in LEXIS,
Envitl. Library.
111. Id.
112. See Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (the
government's summary judgment motion was granted, denying defendant-lessor's de-
fense that his lessee was responsible for contaminating the site).
113. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., [18 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,133 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987) (although the contamination was
caused solely by the illegal acts of employees, who accepted bribes to allow hazardous
waste dumping at a city landfill, the court held that the employment contract estab-
lished a "contractual relationship" and that the CERCLA defense did not incorporate
the common law principle that employers are only liable for the acts of their employ-
ees within the scope of employment); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884
(E.D.N.C. 1985) (the defense was unavailable where a facility owner paid a third
party to dispose of the owner's PCB-contaminated oil).
114. See United States v. Hooker Chem. and Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546
(W.D.N.Y. 1988) (held that even if Hooker's predecessor had merely disposed of the
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strictly construe the section 107(b) requirement that the re-
lease be caused solely by the act of a third party with whom
the defendant had no contractual relationship. '1 5 In some cir-
cumstances, defendants have survived the government's mo-
tion for summary judgment. In United States v. Mirabile, the
court applied a pre-SARA standard in denying the govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the sec-
tion 107(b)(3) defense.116 The court held that the defendants
could avail themselves of the section 107(b)(3) defense if they
"could establish that [they] purchased property on which haz-
ardous wastes were placed by others and that [they] did not
add to those wastes[,] exercised due care with respect to the
wastes[, and] took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of others."'17 The defense was not defeated for sum-
mary judgement purposes merely because several hundred
leaking and decomposing drums were visible on the site at the
waste and that the release and migration of the waste were solely caused by a third
party with no contractual relationship, Hooker would be jointly and severally liable
for any and all harm caused by the combination of events); United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (held that waste generator defendants must
present specific evidence demonstrating that all of their waste was removed from the
site prior to the release of hazardous materials, thereby establishing that their waste
was not associated with the release). But see Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. National
Fuel Gas Distrib., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendant property seller sur-
vived a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether it was entitled to as-
sert the innocent landowner defense because there was a factual question as to
whether a third party caused the release of hazardous substances placed in the
ground by the defendant. The court distinguished Hooker on the ground "that not
every contractual relationship precludes a former owner from invoking section
107(b)(3) and the [defendant was] entitled to present proof that [the] construction
activities at the site were not undertaken 'in connection with' its contractual relation-
ship"). Id. at 1286.
115. See United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (third-party defense fails where the government has proved that at least some
of defendant's arsenic contamination is at the site and defendant merely offers specu-
lative and uncertain proof that arsenic contamination is attributable to other parties);
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (the section
107(b)(3) defense is not available where defendants have failed to argue that a third
party was the sole cause of the release).
116. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985).
117. Id. at 20,994.
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time of purchase. " 8
Similarly, in United States v. Serafini,"9 the govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the de-
fense was denied due to the government's failure to present
specific evidence showing that defendant Serafini had "spe-
cialized knowledge" or "reason to know" of the presence of
hazardous substances at the site.120 The court was not per-
suaded by the government's showing that over 1,000 fifty-five-
gallon drums were visible at the time of purchase, 2' holding
that a failure to inspect the site is not necessarily inconsistent
with the section 101(35)(B) requirement of all appropriate in-
quiry consistent with good commercial practice.12
In International Clinical Lab. v. Stevens, 23 the court
suggested that a purchaser of a contaminated site was pro-
tected by the section 107(b)(3) defense even though the pur-
chaser failed to inquire into public records which would have
alerted him to the presence of contamination. In Stevens, the
contaminated site was placed on the New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation Inactive Hazardous
Waste Disposal Site list prior to purchase by the plaintiff. Al-
though no environmental problems were visible at the time of
sale, the purchaser had apparently not inquired into public
records which would have confirmed that metals and solvents
had been disposed of in cesspools and existed in high concen-
trations on the site. The court concluded that the previous
owner and lessee were not entitled to contribution from the
purchaser for response costs. 2" In dicta, the court stated that
the purchaser had satisfied the requirements of CERCLA sec-
tions 107(b)(3) and 101(35)(A). 12 5 Although the Stevens court
did not provide its reasoning, its conclusion suggests that a
118. Id.
119. 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
120. Id. at 352.
121. Id. at 348.
122. Id. at 352.
123. [20 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,560 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
1990).
124. Id. at 20,561.
125. Id.
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failure to discover important public information is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with good commercial practice for con-
ducting appropriate inquiries.
As of this writing, a party has succeeded with the defense
in only one case. In United States v. Pacific Hide and Fur
Depot, Inc.,12a the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, where the hazardous waste was disposed of prior
to the initial transfer of title, and there was no evidence to
show that a release occurred while any of the defendants
owned the site. Defendants' success was largely based on the
fact that the transactions at issue were in the nature of inheri-
tance or bequest, and were not part of a commercial
transaction.127
The courts have applied varying standards when weighing
a particular purchaser's pre-purchase inquiry. In Serafini, the
defendant survived summary judgment although he failed to
conduct any inquiry at all. In Stevens, the court would have
allowed the defense even though the fact that the site was
contaminated was a matter of public record. However, in
BCW Assoc., a pre-purchase inspection of a facility by a con-
sultant and engineer did not satisfy the "all appropriate in-
quiry" requirement. The uncertain disposition reflected in the
case law is a result of two factors: 1) the lack of a definitive,
widely recognized standard for pre-purchase investigations,
requiring courts to determine investigation standards on a
case-by-case basis; 2 ' and 2) the inherent conflict in providing
a "due diligence" defense in a strict liability statute. The in-
nocent landowner defense involves a negligence standard. If
the purchaser fails to perform his statutory duty to investi-
gate, then he can not escape strict CERCLA liability. When
126. [19 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,897 (D. Idaho Mar. 13,
1989).
127. Id. at 20,900. The legislative history of SARA indicates that Congress in-
tended to impose a three-tier system of strictness on the duty to investigate prior to a
transaction: 1) commercial transactions are held to the strictest standard; 2) private
transactions are given more leniency; and 3) transfers by inheritance or bequest are
treated the most leniently. H.R. CON. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88
(1986).
128. See infra note 140.
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applying such standards, courts inevitably weigh equitable
factors into their decisions, such as the financial positions of
the parties to the transaction, the burden or benefit realized
from the cleanup, and the relative culpability of the parties. 12
As a result, there is no consistently applied rule to which pur-
chasers may adhere to protect themselves from liability.
3. What Constitutes "All Appropriate Inquiry?"
As the existing case law shows, a wide variety of actions
and relationships will preclude the section 107(b)(3) defense,
resulting in a very narrow range of circumstances in which it
is available. An "innocent landowner" defendant is required
to exercise due care, to protect against the foreseeable acts
and omissions of third parties, and to establish that he had no
"contractual relationship" with the third party causing the re-
lease by showing that he conducted "all appropriate inquiry"
into the previous ownership. 30 A prospective purchaser must
carefully consider the findings of the inquiry in deciding
whether- to inquire further or to proceed with the
transaction.' 3 '
The intent of SARA's amendment of the provisions of the
"innocent landowner" defense was to exclude from liability
good-faith purchasers of contaminated sites. 132 Unfortunately,
in solving one problem, Congress created another. Although
there is now a clear duty upon prospective purchasers to con-
duct "all appropriate inquiry" prior to acquisition, there is lit-
tle official guidance as to what level of inquiry is required be-
yond the five general factors provided in section 101(35)(B).133
129. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 97-98.
131. See supra note 103.
132. The SARA conference committee report states that the "definition of con-
tractual relationship is intended to clarify and confirm that under limited circum-
stances landowners who acquire property without knowing of any contamination at
the site and without reason to know of any contamination ... may have a defense to
liability." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986).
133. The five factors enumerated in CERCLA § 101(35)(B) are:
1. any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant;
2. the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if
uncontaminated;
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The statutory terms should serve to preclude the section
107(b)(3) defense in cases where a purchaser acquires an obvi-
ously contaminated property, although the Serafini decision
suggests otherwise.1 3 4 However, there is little guidance as to
how much diligence, if any, is required to detect hidden con-
tamination such as abandoned landfills, underground storage
tanks, subsurface contamination from past dumping, or the
subsurface migration of contaminants from adjacent areas, all
of which are sufficient to trigger CERCLA liability. So far, the
courts have avoided articulating a standard which would clar-
ify the duties of a purchaser under the "appropriate inquiry"
standard.
The general nature of both the statutory language and
the legislative history supports the view that the adequacy of
an inquiry with negative findings must be judged on a case-
by-case basis. 1 5 In cases where a purchaser is genuinely "in-
nocent," that is, where he has exercised due care, took reason-
able steps toward an "appropriate inquiry," and can show
that the release was caused by an unrelated third party (i.e.,
where the equitable factors are in his favor), his success with
the defense will depend heavily on the court's evaluation of
the standards for conducting "all appropriate inquiry."
By requiring that the "appropriate inquiry" be consistent
with "good commercial practice,""1 Congress apparently de-
ferred responsibility to the real estate industry for establish-
ing and maintaining the guidelines for conducting pre-
purchase inquiries. The current state of the industry com-
prises various publications by realtors, lawyers, financiers, en-
vironmental engineers, and consultants describing the require-
3. commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
property;
4. the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the
property; and
5. the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
CERCLA § 101(35)(B).
134. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
135. The SARA conference committee report states that a purchaser should "ex-
ercise that degree of due care which is reasonable under the circumstances." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986).
136. See supra note 98.
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ments of "environmental audits" for real estate
transactions.13
7
The "all appropriate inquiry" standard is subjective and
must be evaluated against good commercial practice as it ex-
isted "as of the time of acquisition.' ' 3 8 This task is difficult
for several reasons: 1) there are a wide variety of publications
recommending requirements for environmental audits for real
estate transactions, creating a large, sometimes conflicting
body of materials from which to extract a current standard;'39
2) the recommended practices for environmental audits have
evolved rapidly over the last ten years as a response to grow-
ing public awareness of hazardous waste, thus making it diffi-
cult to pin down a standard as it existed at a particular point
in time;4 0 and 3) many properties and facilities have unique
137. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF 1991 ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS CASE
STUDIES AND STRATEGIES: THE CONFERENCE (The Fawcett Center for Tomorrow, 1991);
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS, DRAFT STANDARD GUIDE FOR
PHASE I ENVIRONMENTAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS (1991); ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
(Lawrence B. Cahill ed., 6th ed. 1989); Gary C. Ribblett & Kris H. Turschmid, Advice
From Environmental Consultants: How to Achieve Competent, Comprehensive and
Understandable Results from Environmental Audits, 41 S.C. L. REV. 887 (1990);
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, SCREENING REAL ESTATE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS, LENDERS & DEVELOPERS (1989); ASFE/
THE ASSOCIATION OF ENGINEERING FIRMS PRACTICING IN THE GEOSCIENCES, PREACQUISI-
TION SITE ASSESSMENTS (1989); CONSULTING ENGINEERS COUNCIL OF METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON INC., GUIDELINES ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS (1989); EPA, SE-
LECTED CURRENT PRACTICES IN PROPERTY TRANSFER ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
(Sept. 1989); Baker, Tainted Property: Hazardous Substances, Hazardous Waste
and Asbestos in Real Property Transactions, in THE SEVENTH ANNUAL SEMINAR ON
HAZARDOUS WASTE AND TOXIC TORTS: REGULATION-LIABILITY 119 (Lippes & Wrubel
Co-Chairpersons 1989); JOEL S. MOSKOWITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1989) (detailed comprehensive audit
forms are included in Appendix D); STEVEN A. TASHER AT AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
AND REAL ESTATE HANDBOOK, IV-8 to -9 (2d ed. 1988); Reich & Leifer, The Effect of
CERCLA on Property Transfers, in Miller & Bennet, Due Diligence Techniques for
the Innocent Landowner/Purchaser, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 434 (1988); RAYMOND
W. KANE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1987); Elliott H.
Levitas & John V. Hughes, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real Estate Transactions, 38
MERCER L. REV. 581 (1987).
138. HR. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986). "[Glood commer-
cial or customary practice .. . shall mean that reasonable inquiry must have been
made in all circumstances, in light of best business and land transfer principles." Id.
139. See supra note 130.
140. The practice of conducting environmental audits for real estate transactions
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attributes, making it difficult to determine what procedures
may or may not have been appropriate at a particular site.
Even if a regulatory standard is promulgated to provide a
bench mark against which future inquiries may be weighed,
with regard to past transactions, courts still must determine
"good commercial or customary practice" as it existed at the
time of the transaction.
4. "Good Commercial or Customary Practice" Today
With the volume of writings that have been produced to
date, a rather clear industry standard has emerged for con-
ducting "all appropriate inquiry ... consistent with good com-
mercial or customary practice. '1 4' The authorities generally
agree that a "phase I environmental audit" should be con-
ducted by an environmental consultant or engineer, and
should include a visual review of the facility, a review of avail-
able documentation concerning the past use of the site, and a
review of government records to determine the site's environ-
mental regulatory history."41
5. Legislative Answers
While the phase I environmental audit industry has
evolved to a stage where a general standard exists, the current
lack of a regulatory standard leaves room for confusion and
could lead to unnecessary litigation. Lawmakers have re-
sponded to this confusion by proposing legislation to clarify
is a relatively recent development. See Frank J. Priznar, Trends in Environmental
Auditing [20 News and Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,179 (May 1990).
Prior to 1986, most environmental publications discussed environmental audits
mainly in the context of inspections conducted under regulatory statutes, such as the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). See, e.g., J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HAND-
BOOK (7th ed. 1983); ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS (Lawrence B. Cahill et al., ed., 3d ed.
1984); John M. DeMeester, Practical Guidelines for Due Diligence Environmental
Auditing [18 News and Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 12,210 (June 1988).
141. A survey of environmental professionals, released in 1991, indicates that a
"professional standard of care already exists." David Stamps, In Search of Due Dili-
gence, EI DIGEST, Sept. 1991, at 35. CERCLA "appropriate inquiries" are commonly
referred to as "phase I environmental audits" or "environmental site assessments."
142. See supra note 130.
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the CERCLA duties of a prospective real estate purchaser.
a. Proposed Amendments to CERCLA
In 1989, Congressman Weldon introduced H.R. 2787, the
"Innocent Landowner Defense Amendment of 1989. " 143 The
bill proposed requirements for a "Phase I Environmental Au-
dit," which if performed prior to a transaction would establish
a rebuttable presumption that the defendant conducted "all
appropriate inquiry" for the purposes of CERCLA section
101(35)(B). 1 " The Phase I requirements specified by H.R.
2787 are essentially in agreement with today's state-of-the-art
practices, and would have been useful in establishing a base-
line set of requirements for property transfer environmental
audits.
Because H.R. 2787 was not passed, it can be argued that
rather than characterizing "good commercial practice" in
1989, Congress' disposition of the bill suggests a preference for
case-by-case standards as opposed to fixed requirements. As
such, the history of H.R. 2787 may complicate, rather than
resolve, future litigation.
Similar provisions were included in the "Superfund Lia-
bility Clarification Act" introduced by Congressman Owens in
1991.' 45 Like the LaFalce bill, the Superfund Liability Clarifi-
cation Act would establish a rebuttable presumption of "all
143. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
144. H.R. 2787 proposed that the Phase I audit be conducted by an "environ-
mental professional," defined as an attorney, engineer or consultant possessing appro-
priate academic training and reputation. The requirements of the Phase I audit con-
tained in the bill include:
-a review of the chain of title going back 50 years;
-review of aerial photographs to determine prior use of the site;
-review of reasonably obtainable federal, state and local records regarding
hazardous waste activities on the site;
-a visual site inspection.
If the Phase I audit discloses the likely presence of hazardous substances, then
the presumption of the "appropriate inquiry" shall not arise unless the defendant has
taken reasonable steps in accordance with existing regulations and acceptable engi-
neering practices to confirm the presence or absence of the threat. In other words,
Phase II testing must be performed if the Phase I inquiry finds the presence of con-
tamination likely. Id.
145. H.R. 1643, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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appropriate inquiry" for real estate purchasers who conduct a
"Phase I Environmental Audit." The bill would establish a
regulatory program in which the states would accredit "Certi-
fied Environmental Professionals" who perform audits, and it
would adopt a regulatory standard for conducting "Phase I
Environmental Audits."1" 6
b. State Laws
Several states have enacted laws specifying disclosure
and/or investigation requirements prior to commercial real es-
tate transactions." 7 While these laws may clearly establish a
purchaser's duties under a state "Superfund" law, it is far
from clear that compliance with these laws will satisfy CER-
CLA. The requirements under many state laws (the New
Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA)
not included) are less rigorous than the current industry prac-
tices. In light of the narrow application of the section
107(b).(3) defense by the courts, it appears unlikely that the
limited duties established under most state laws would suffice
for purposes of establishing an "appropriate inquiry consis-
tent with good commercial practice" for CERCLA purposes.
IV. Conclusion
Although Congress intended CERCLA liability to be
strict, it provided narrow exceptions in certain situations. Un-
fortunately, these exceptions are vaguely defined in the stat-
ute, and judicial interpretations have tended to exacerbate,
rather than to clarify, the uncertainty surrounding the terms
of the defenses. As a result, the real estate community and its
associated industries have been operating in recent years in a
state of confusion under the ominous threat of CERCLA lia-
146. Id. H.R. 1643 would adopt the standard currently being developed by the
American Society for Testing and Materials as the regulatory standard for conducting
Phase I Environmental Audits. Id.
147. See, e.g., Responsible Property Transfer Law, (IND. CODE ANN.) § 13-7-22.5-
1 to -22 (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1991); Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, (N.J.
STAT. ANN.) §§ 13:1k-6 to -14 (West Supp. 1991); (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.) §§ 22a-134
to -134(d) (West Supp. 1991).
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bility. However, their complaints have not been ignored, and
current efforts to develop standards for real estate lenders and
purchasers should provide a measure of protection for those
willing to assert due diligence and act responsibly.
The uncertainty for lenders arises from the section
101(20)(A) secured creditor exemption and its use of the term
''management participation." The Ninth Circuit's standard of
actual participation, stated in the Bergsoe Metal1 48 decision,
is a workable standard which allows lenders to generally gauge
their status with regard to the exemption. However, the Elev-
enth Circuit's "capacity to influence" test, articulated in the
Fleet Factors149 decision, broadened the potential liability of
lenders to an unprecedented level. Under the Fleet Factors
standard, lenders must make a difficult decision in structuring
loan agreements: either to dissociate themselves from their
borrowers' operations such that they are unable to influence
management decisions, thus choosing a greater risk of default
rather than potential CERCLA liability; or to regulate and in-
spect their borrowers' operations, essentially becoming private
environmental protection agencies.
After several years of confusion, however, it appears that
some standards have, or are about to become, recognized. Pro-
posed EPA regulations would codify the Bergsoe Metal inter-
pretation that "management participation" under section
101(20)(A) requires actual participation. If promulgated, the
regulations should serve to limit government enforcement ac-
tions to situations in which a lender has actually influenced
hazardous waste management practices. In addition, the regu-
lations should serve to guide the courts in private party CER-
CLA litigation involving secured creditors.
The uncertainty for real estate purchasers arises from the
section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense and its use of
the term "all appropriate inquiry." The statute itself provides
only general guidance as to the scope and depth of the inquiry
required. Federal regulations clarifying "all appropriate in-
quiry" have yet to be accepted, and the courts have applied
148. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
149. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
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varying interpretations as to the adequacy of particular inves-
tigations. As a result, a purchaser of an apparently uncontam-
inated site can not be certain of protecting himself from po-
tential CERCLA liability, regardless of the diligence exercised
in investigating the property.
Although industry standards for environmental assess-
ments (or "audits") have evolved into a recognized and some-
what uniform practice, the BCW Associates'"0 case illustrates
that a determination of the adequacy of a particular assess-
ment requires consideration of the circumstances on a case-
by-case basis. Because of the uniqueness of real estate and the
unlimited variety of activities that may have occurred on or
adjacent to a specific site in the past, environmental inspec-
tors must exercise considerable discretion in performing as-
sessments and arriving at their conclusions. Without clear
standards for conducting environmental assessments, it can be
argued that any investigation which fails to detect hidden
contamination may be insufficient to rise to the level of an
"appropriate inquiry."
Current practices in environmental auditing can be estab-
lished by reviewing the numerous publications on the subject
by engineers, consultants, and lawyers. While proposed Con-
gressional bills to incorporate these practices into law have
been unsuccessful, the development of the ASTM standard on
environmental assessment should provide a comprehensive
and widely recognized standard for conducting "all appropri-
ate inquiry." "Innocent" purchasers and the courts should be
able to use these industry standards, as defined by ASTM, as
a decisionmaking tool in evaluating the adequacy of a particu-
lar environmental assessment and the degree of diligence re-
quired under the circumstances.
Amending CERCLA to provide broad exceptions for
lenders and purchasers would not be consistent with the stat-
ute's remedial purpose. In order to allow CERCLA's system of
strict liability to operate as intended without wreaking finan-
cial ruin on "innocent" parties, official standards for environ-
150. 3 Toxics L. Rep. 943 (BNA) (E.D. Pa 1988), available in LEXIS, Envtl.
Library.
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mental assessments and for lender management participation
are essential. Not only would such standards reduce future lit-
igation attempting to resolve the undefined statutory phrases,
but they would also delineate the boundary within which "in-
nocent" purchasers and responsible lenders could operate
without the unreasonable fear of CERCLA liability.
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